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Abstract
In empirically informed research on action explanation, philosophers and develop-
mental psychologists have recently proposed a teleological account of the way in
which we make sense of people’s intentional behavior. It holds that we typically don’t
explain an agent’s action by appealing to her mental states but by referring to the
objective, publically accessible facts of the world that count in favor of performing the
action so as to achieve a certain goal. Advocates of the teleological account claim that
this strategy is our main way of understanding people’s actions. I argue that common
motivations mentioned to support the teleological account are insufficient to sustain its
generalization from children to adults. Moreover, social psychological studies, com-
bined with theoretical considerations, suggest that we do not explain actions mainly
by invoking publically accessible, reason-giving facts alone but by ascribing mental
states to the agent.
Keywords Teleology · Mentalizing · Action explanation · Social psychology ·
Reasons · Intelligibility test
1 Introduction
Suppose that a subject S is on her way to the station to take a train to work. She arrives
late at the station, looks at the platform, sees a train is about to leave, and suddenly
starts running towards it. What S is doing is an intentional action. How do we explain
her behavior?
According to the standard account of action explanation in philosophy and psychol-
ogy, we explain what S is doing by appealing to the mental states, more specifically,
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the propositional attitudes (e.g., beliefs, desires etc.) that underlie her behavior (Perner
and Roessler 2010). We explain her running toward the train by holding that she (1)
believes that the train is leaving, (2) believes that running towards it will help her catch
the train, and (3) wants to catch it (Anscombe 1957; Davidson 1963; Goldman 1970;
Malle et al. 2007; for discussion, see Alvarez 2016).
While this mentalistic account of what S is doing can be viewed as the received
proposal on action explanation, many theorists have criticized it and proposed alterna-
tives (Dancy 2008; Alvarez 2010; McDowell 2013). One alternative that has recently
gained momentum among philosophers and developmental psychologists is the tele-
ological account (Gergely and Csibra 2003; Roessler and Perner 2013; Perner and
Esken 2015; Perner et al. 2018).
The account comes in different flavors.1 According to the version that will be
relevant here, we typically do not explain intentional action by reference to the agent’s
mental states but by appealing to the objective, non-mental facts that count in favor of
performing the action (Scanlon 1998), including the objective desirability of the goal
that underlies the action and the facts that are instrumental to achieving the goal.2 On
this view, we would explain S’s running toward the train by holding that (1) the train
is leaving (an objective fact), (2) running towards it will help her catch it (an objective
instrumental fact), and (3) she has the goal to catch the train, as getting one’s train
to work is generally desirable (an objective evaluative fact). We wouldn’t explain S’s
behavior by mentalizing, that is, by thinking about and ascribing to her propositional
attitudes, but by assuming that what she is doing is directed at a state of affairs that is
‘objectively’ good, which is her goal (i.e., catching the train to work), and by appealing
to the non-mental facts that enable her to achieve that goal. This explanatory strategy
has been called teleology (Perner and Roessler 2010; Perner and Esken 2015; Perner
et al. 2018).
My focus here will be on the recent debate on teleology3 in the interdisciplinary
area linking philosophical and psychological research. In that area, most of the work
on teleology is related to developmental psychological data on action explanations in
3- to 4-year-olds. These children have been found to be able to explain intentional
1 There is, for instance, a cybernetics account of teleology, and an Aristotelian one (Perner and Esken
2015). Gergely and Csibra (2003) propose the former. They understand goal pursuit in the way it is done
in cybernetics: a system is built so as to respond to different circumstances in such a way that it ends up in
a particular state (the goal state). Gergely and Csibra don’t appeal to evaluative facts as the source of goals
but take the notion of goals as primitive. In contrast, on the Aristotelian view, which is favored by Perner
and colleagues (and the one I’ll focus on here), goals are inherently value-laden, and their explanatory force
is inseparable from their evaluative properties; for discussion, see Perner and Esken (2015, p. 76f).
2 The mentalistic view and the teleological proposal can also be distinguished by reference to the notions
of justifying reasons and motivating reasons. A justifying reason for A-ing is any consideration that counts
in favor of A-ing. A motivating reason is a consideration out of which an agent acts (Alvarez 2016). The
mentalistic view is that while justifying reasons may be facts, motivating reasons are mental states. In
contrast, the teleological account proposes that motivating reasons are typically facts too: what motivates
S to act is (in standard situations) the fact that p, not her believing that p, and to explain her action, it is
sufficient to notice a non-mental fact about her action that, in combination with an evaluative fact, counts
in favor of acting that way.
3 Theorizing about teleology has a long tradition in philosophy, going back to Aristotle (Shields 2015) and
continuing in the contemporary literature in the philosophy of action (Wilson 1989; Mele 2010; McLaughlin
2012). I shall not delve into this purely philosophical work here, however.
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action even when they still lack a full understanding of mental states such as beliefs.
Advocates of the teleological account argue that this is because they use teleology
(Gergely and Csibra 2003; Perner and Roessler 2010; Perner and Esken 2015).
What matters here is that proponents of the account tend to make claims that go
beyond developmental psychology and cognition in children. They maintain that the
“teleological account [is of] more than developmental interest”, that teleology also
plays a “central role [in] adult common-sense psychology” (Perner and Roessler 2012,
p. 521), and that the account captures our “standard”, “routine”, and “main way of
understanding people’s behavior” (Perner and Esken 2015, p. 74, 69, 76), the “way in
which we ordinarily understand others’ intentional actions” (Perner et al. 2018, p. 99).
Surprisingly, argumentative support for such general claims about the use of tele-
ology in action explanation is scant. This is surprising because it doesn’t follow that
even if young children typically use a particular method for explaining actions, adults
continue to do so. It is fair to say that it is currently still an open question as to whether
and, if so, to what extent adults use teleology to explain actions.
Why should philosophers care? One reason is that answers to these questions will
help us demarcate the scope of the teleological account, which will in turn advance our
understanding of the nature of action explanation, a key topic of philosophical inquiry
(Davidson 1963; Alvarez 2016). Additionally, the teleological account suggests that
the mentalistic view of action explanation is false. Since that view is widely accepted
in philosophy of action (ibid), if the teleological alternative turns out to be correct (for
children and adults) then a significant revision in the philosophy of action would be
needed. Finally, the teleological account has been developed, defended, and critiqued
by philosophers and not only by psychologists (e.g., Roessler and Perner 2013; Perner
and Esken 2015; Burge 2018). The following discussion on the role of teleology in
action explanation should thus be of interest for both philosophers and psychologists
working on action explanation.
I shall argue for two claims. First, common motivations that have been mentioned
to support the teleological account are insufficient to sustain its generalization from
children to adults. Second, social psychological studies, combined with theoretical
considerations, suggest that as adults we do not explain actions mainly by invoking
reason-giving, non-mental facts alone but by ascribing mental states to the agent. That
is, we don’t predominantly use teleology in our action explanations but mentalizing.
I begin in Sect. 2 by mentioning the reasons that researchers have offered
for holding that children are teleologists when making sense of people’s behav-
ior. In Sect. 3, I turn to claims about the use of teleology in adults and
distinguish different versions of the teleological account that one might adopt.
Upon isolating the one relevant here, I introduce, in Sect. 4, three points that
have been proposed to defend it and highlight shortcomings with them. After
that, in Sect. 5, I argue against the version of the teleological account at
issue. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the discussion.
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2 Teleology in children’s action explanation
The teleological account of action explanation that I want to focus on emerged in
part from the theorizing on children’s performance in the classic4 false-belief task
(FBT) (Wimmer and Perner 1983; Perner and Roessler 2010; Perner et al. 2018). To
introduce the account, it will be useful to briefly consider the general structure of and
key findings from the FBT.5
Schematically, in the task, children are asked to observe two individuals, S and T ,
in a room with two boxes, B1 and B2. S has an object, o, puts it into B1, and leaves
the room. While she is outside, T takes o out of B1, puts it into B2, and leaves the
scene. S returns, and the children are asked where she will look for o. Studies found
that 3-year-olds consistently say that S will go to B2, where o in fact is. It is not until
they are 4 that neurotypical children pass the test and correctly say that S will look in
B1, where she falsely believes o to be (Wellman et al. 2001).
Advocates of the teleological account argue that since 3-year-olds reliably predict
that S will look for o in B2 (rather than, say, under the kitchen table), these children
assume that people’s behavior is determined by factors counting in favor of acting.
The idea is that the children think that since S wants to find o, looking in B2 is what
she should be doing. After all, that is where o is and where she will find it. Children
assume that S has thus a good reason to go to B2. Or so advocates of the teleological
account propose (Perner and Roessler 2010; Perner et al. 2018).
These researchers distinguish between two kinds of reasons that subjects might
invoke: objective reasons and subjective reasons (ibid). Objective reasons are taken
to be publically accessible facts of the world that count in favor of acting in a certain
way. They include instrumental facts, which pertain to the means to achieve a certain
goal, and evaluative facts, which pertain to what is objectively important, desirable,
necessary, or good for the agent, where the term ‘objectively’ is construed as ‘indepen-
dently of one’s subjective viewpoint’ (e.g., catching one’s train to work is objectively
good) (Roessler and Perner 2013, p. 37; Perner and Roessler 2010, p. 204). Advocates
of the teleological account hold that in the FBT, S has an objective reason to go to B2
because that is where o is and so for her to get. In contrast, “subjective reasons are
the contents of mental states like beliefs and desires” (Perner and Esken 2015, p. 71).
“To say that you have a subjective reason to [ϕ] is to say that, from your perspective,
it looks as if you have an (objective) reason to do so” (Perner and Roessler 2010,
p. 204). In the FBT, S has a subjective reason to go to B1 (rather than B2) because that
is where, from her own perspective, o is (Perner and Roessler 2012, p. 521).6
4 The ‘classic’ FBT requires test subjects to produce verbal reports. More recent versions of the task are
non-verbal and involve, for instance, looking time measures to assess mental-state understanding. In such
FBTs, already 7-months-olds have been found to exhibit some understanding of false beliefs (see Schneider
et al. 2015; but, as in other areas of psychology, replicability has recently become an issue, see Poulin-Dubois
et al. 2018).
5 The term ‘FBT’ refers here and henceforth only to the classic version of the FBT (as opposed to tasks
using, e.g., looking time measures).
6 In holding that S has a subjective reason to go to B1 because from her perspective that is where o is, i.e.,
where she believes it to be, advocates of the teleological account propose that non-factive mental states can
be subjective reasons. Their notion of a subjective reason is thus different from that of certain externalist
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Advocates of the teleological account propose that 3-year-olds’ normative attitude
toward an agent’s behavior is based only on an understanding of objective reasons
(Perner and Roessler 2010, p. 205). They grant that 3-year-olds also need to have an
understanding of what S wants in order to be able to judge that she will go to B2.
But they maintain that this doesn’t undermine the teleological account, for the notion
of desire that these children have needn’t involve the assumption that wanting is a
subjective, mental state. For instance, when 3-year-olds assume that S wants to find
o, these children might take her wanting to do so to be “provided by the objective
desirability” of finding o, as it is generally desirable to find what one is looking for
(ibid, p. 214). Alternatively, they might view S as wanting to find o in that she needs
to do so, which is again specifiable without reference to mental states (ibid).
The teleological account does, however, seem to face significant problems with
scenarios in which action is based on a false belief. This is because no non-mental
fact then exists that could be a subject’s objective reason for acting. To deal with these
cases, advocates of the teleological account hold that when, for instance, S proceeds
to B1 (which doesn’t contain o), children can explain S’s behavior by employing
“teleology within [S’s] perspective”, interpreting her as acting on the basis of what
from her perspective appears to be an objective reason (Roessler and Perner 2013,
p. 46; Perner et al. 2018, p. 100). The transition from “pure teleology” (henceforth
PT ), which is the ability to explain behavior by appeal to objective reasons alone, to
“teleology-in-perspective” (henceforth TiP), which involves appealing to an agent’s
subjective reason(s), is thought to happen at around age 4 (ibid).
Crucially, advocates of the teleological account tend to maintain that TiP doesn’t
yet require mentalizing, that is, thinking about and ascribing propositional attitudes
such as beliefs and desires. It is taken to rest only a more general understanding of
the idea that “having informational access to the relevant facts is a prerequisite for
action” (Perner and Esken 2015, p. 76), or an ability to engage in “counterfactual
thinking” (e.g., ‘If o were still in its original location then there would be a good
reason for S to go there to get it.’) (Roessler and Perner 2013, p. 37f). In fact, if
advocates of the teleological account held that TiP does already involve mentalizing
then their proposal would, when it comes to TiP, coincide with the standard mentalistic
account of action explanation, and that would be in tension with the overall anti-
mentalistic spirit of the teleological approach (Perner et al. 2018, p. 106f). The proposal
is thus different. It is that when employing TiP, subjects don’t yet conceptualize the
agent’s subjective reasons as propositional attitudes but merely as “perspectival” facts,
as objective reasons from within the agent’s perspective (ibid). To capture this TiP-
specific point about the teleological account, I will use the term ‘subjective reason’ to
refer only to perspectival facts, not to propositional attitudes conceptualized as such
by the explainer. As will become clear in a moment, this non-mentalistic reading of
TiP is well supported by claims that advocates of the teleological account make about
teleology in adults’ action explanations.
Footnote 6 continued
views about rationality, according to which what is rational to do is determined by what one knows rather
than merely believes. Advocates of a factive account of subjective reasons might disagree with proponents
of the teleological account. Since I don’t endorse the teleological account but only aim to offer an exposition
of it here, I shall set the issue aside.
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3 From children to adults: variants of the teleological account
So far I have focused mostly on the use of teleology in children, but, as noted, advocates
of the teleological account maintain that their proposal equally holds for adults. Before
introducing their specific view on the matter, it will be useful to distinguish different
versions of the teleological account applied to action explanations in adults. Four
proposals come to mind:
1. Adults explain action by ascribing propositional attitudes to agents and by relying
inter alia on teleological principles linking objective or subjective reasons to action
but they never explain action in terms of objective or subjective reasons alone.
2. Adults mainly explain action by ascribing propositional attitudes to agents, and
rarely do so by invoking only objective or subjective reasons.
3. Adults often explain action by ascribing propositional attitudes to agents, and often
do so by invoking only objective or subjective reasons.
4. Adults mainly explain action by invoking only objective or subjective reasons, and
rarely do so by ascribing propositional attitudes to agents.
Proposal (1) is much in line with the received mentalistic view of action explanation.
It only adds to it that adults might also use teleological principles to make sense of
people’s behavior. Proposals (2) and (3) are modest too in that they grant that people
frequently explain actions by mentalizing. I shall set (1), (2), and (3) aside for now.
I want to focus on proposal (4), because it is the most ambitious type of teleological
account (henceforth the sole referent of ‘teleological account’), and the one that is
currently endorsed by most advocates of the view that teleology is involved in action
explanation. Here is some textual evidence.
After mentioning an example in which an action is explained by reference to objec-
tive facts alone (i.e., ‘Bernhard the baker gets up at 3 am, because he has to have the
bread ready by 7, and he can only deliver it by 7 if he gets up at 3.’), Perner and Esken
(2015) write,
When describing the case of Bernhard the baker, we naturally provided reasons
for explaining his unusual behavior of getting up at 3 in the morning. This made
it a natural explanation, which makes us think that teleology is our standard
way for making sense of what people are doing. The use of a theory of mental
states as assumed in ‘mentalizing’, or imaginative identification as assumed in
simulation theory, remain the techniques for special cases. (p. 74)
The claim is that the view that we typically use mentalizing in action explanations
“leads to an over-intellectualization of our everyday explanations of others’ actions”:
We do not see ourselves as being made to act by unobservable internal states. We
see ourselves as acting for reasons, which are provided by publicly accessible
circumstances in our surroundings. And so – our claim – we consider others to
be and act like us. (Perner and Esken 2015, p. 74)
Similarly, Perner et al. (2018) note that a “teleologist is concerned primarily with
worldly facts” (p. 101–102). The idea is that even when TiP is at issue, “for this, the
teleologist need not construe people as entertaining mental representations of events
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in the world. Mentalizing only becomes relevant for covering unusual cases” (Perner
and Esken 2015, p. 76).
In short, the proposal is that teleology (PT or TiP) is distinct from (implicit or
explicit) mentalizing in that it doesn’t involve viewing agents as acting on the basis of
mental states, and plays a “central role [in] adult common-sense psychology” (Perner
and Roessler 2012, p. 521), constituting our “routine”, “main way of understanding
people’s behavior” (Perner and Esken 2015, p. 76), “the way in which we ordinarily
understand others’ intentional actions” (Perner et al. 2018, p. 99). This interesting
and, if true, explanatorily powerful proposal will be my target from now on. Notice
that while the responses of 3-year-olds in FBTs, which I mentioned in the preceding
section, might provide good grounds to hold that these children use PT , they don’t
yet show that PT or TiP is also involved in action explanation in adults. So what is
the support that advocates of the teleological account offer for their generalization to
adults?
4 Arguments for the use of teleology in adults
To motivate the view that adults use teleology in their action explanations, advocates
of the teleological account have mentioned different points. Interestingly, none of
them pertains to adults’ use of TiP and subjective reasons. They relate only to PT , and
adults’ reference to objective reasons in their explanations of actions. I shall briefly
discuss what I take to be the three main points.
Argument 1 It is natural and familiar among adults to explain, for instance, S’s
running toward her train to work by saying that the train is leaving, she needs to
catch it, and running towards the train helps her achieve that. That is, it is common
among adults to refer in their reports of action explanations to non-mental facts, which
suggests that they use objective reasons in their action explanation (Perner and Esken
2015, p. 74).
Response When adults mention objective facts in their reports on why S is acting in
the way she is, this is arguably just shorthand. For there is reason to believe that implicit
inferences about S’s mental states are involved in forming the action explanation.
Consider the following three scenarios:
(1) Why is S running toward the train?
(1a) Because that’s the way to catch the train.
(1b) Because that’s the way to catch the train, but she doesn’t believe it.
(2) Why is S calling her boss?
(2a) To give notice.
(2b) To give notice, but she doesn’t intend to give notice.
(3) Why is S working 7 days a week?
(3a) To make more money.
(3b) To make more money, but she doesn’t want to make more money.
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While statements (1a), (2a), and (3a) are acceptable action explanations that cohere
with and support the teleological account, (1b), (2b), and (3b) seem odd in ways that
may bring to mind “Moore’s paradox”, which is captured in assertions of the form ‘p,
but I don’t believe that p’ (Moore 1993, p. 207f). Because if S needs to catch the train
but doesn’t believe that running toward it is the way to do so, it becomes difficult to
see what could lead her to act that way. Similarly, learning that S doesn’t intend to give
notice casts doubt on the view that she is calling her boss to give notice, just as much
as learning that she doesn’t want to make more money challenges the view that she is
working 7 days to make more money.7 These statements might be interpreted in ways
that make them tenable, but they do seem odd and violate expectations. This suggests
that expressions of action explanations that appear to support a teleological account
[i.e., (1a), (2a), and (3a)] are partly based on an implicit ascription of propositional
attitudes. I shall refer to this strategy of revealing underlying implicit assumptions
as the intelligibility test for action explanations. The test will become relevant again
below. For now, the point is just that the test suggests that citing expressions such as
(1a), (2a), or (3a) isn’t sufficient to show that adults explain behavior via PT or TiP.
Argument 2 In our own case, we typically determine and explain what we are doing
by appealing to the non-mental facts that we assume will allow us to achieve our goals.
For instance,
Suppose you suddenly remember that there is a staff meeting at 2 pm. Should
you leave your office now to go to the meeting? It would not be sensible for you
to try to settle this question by looking for evidence as to whether you believe it
to be 2 pm. Whether you have a good reason to set off now depends on what the
actual time is. (Perner and Roessler 2012, p. 521)
This, advocates of the teleological account argue, suggests that even as adults we use
PT in action explanations (ibid).
Response Notice first that the claim about the involvement of teleology in adults’
action explanations is meant to hold for both one’s own and other people’s actions.
Argument 2, however, focuses only on first-person action explanations. And even if we
accept that we do explain what we ourselves are doing in terms of the objective reasons8
(i.e., the instrumental and evaluative facts) that figure in our practical reasoning, it isn’t
obvious, and the point at issue doesn’t show, that we also do so in the case of other
people’s actions.
7 Unger (1978, p. 258f) has used a similar strategy (though focusing mostly on first-personal sentences) to
argue that the oddness of Moorean assertions such as ‘p, but I’m not absolutely sure that p’ or ‘p, but I don’t
know that p’ indicates the presence of attitudes toward p other than belief (in the speaker), i.e., certainty or
knowledge. I’m grateful to a reviewer of this journal for drawing my attention to Unger’s work, and agree
that it is worth thinking more about Moore-paradoxical sentences to explore the implications of such less
noticed versions of them for our epistemological theorizing. The point also holds for the third-personal
cases I’m considering here. Suppose, for instance, that in response to ‘Why did Jane call her husband?’ we
hear ‘Because she was late for dinner, but she didn’t know it’. That response sounds problematic which
suggests that in giving the reason that she was late we assume that Jane didn’t only believe she was late
but also knew it. This points to a possible extension of my argument here: an analysis of the linguistic
expressions of action explanations might suggest that actions require not only beliefs but also knowledge.
8 There is ground to reject the antecedent. Consider: ‘Why are you running toward the train?’ (1) ‘Because
it’s leaving.’ (2) ‘Because it’s leaving, but I don’t believe that it’s leaving.’ The oddness of (2) seems to
indicate an implicit self-ascription of a belief.
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Argument 3 When we are asked to offer practical advice to S, the natural way to
proceed is to reflect on the facts of her situation. For instance, if S asked you where
she should go to get o, it wouldn’t be very helpful to say ‘You should go to B1; after
all, you believe that is where o is.’ The more natural advice seems to be ‘You should
go to B2. You have reason to, that is where o is.’ The structure of your advice suggests
that people invoke objective reasons in their thinking about others’ actions (ibid).
Response The point illustrates only the role that objective reasons might play in giv-
ing people advice. It is insufficient to support the view that in order to explain people’s
actions, we tend to appeal to these reasons also. Giving people advice and explaining
their actions are two different things. And for all that the mentioned consideration
shows, we wouldn’t appeal to objective reasons in our explanations of others’ actions
unless we (implicitly or explicitly) assumed that they believe the facts constituting
these reasons.
In sum, more support is needed for the claim that adults explain action in terms
of objective reasons. In fact, the teleological account is so far not only insufficiently
supported, it is also directly challenged by empirical data. This is what I shall argue
next.
5 A problem for the teleological account
If the teleological account were correct then people shouldn’t predominantly invoke
an agent’s beliefs and desires in their action explanations. The verbal reports capturing
these explanations should contain only an infrequent reference to beliefs and desires.
One discipline in which reports of action explanations have been systematically gath-
ered and analyzed is social psychology. To examine the tenability of the teleological
account and explore the frequency of action explanations involving belief and desire
ascriptions, it will thus be useful to consider social psychological data.
5.1 Social psychology, reasons, and action explanations
Bertram Malle, Joshua Knobe, and colleagues have done much experimental work on
action explanations in adults (Malle 1999; Knobe and Malle 2002; Malle et al. 2007).
To find out how people explain actions, they presented their test subjects with different
kinds of behavior and then asked them for explanations of them. The behaviors were
selected by the participants themselves, derived from their spontaneous interactions, or
predetermined by the experimenters. It turned out that for intentional actions, people
tended to use one of the following three modes of explanation. They mentioned,
what Malle et al. call, (1) reason explanations, (2) causal history of reason (CHR)
explanations, or (3) enabling factor explanations.
On Malle et al.’s view, “[w]hen people cite a reason explanation for an action, they
ascribe to the agent one or more beliefs or desires that (they presume) figured in the
agent’s decision to so act” (2007, p. 493). Reason explanations are formed via “taking
the perspective” of the agent so as to work out what led him/her to act (ibid). For
instance, ‘Kim chose not to vote in the last election, because she believed that none of
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the candidates was trustworthy’ was categorized as a reason explanation. In contrast,
CHR explanations are explanations that don’t involve belief-desire ascriptions, don’t
pick out factors that figure in the agent’s practical inference motivating the action, and
don’t involve perspective taking (ibid). They refer to causal aspects external to the
agent’s judgment- and decision-making, and include an agent’s disposition, personal-
ity, upbringing, culture, or context. For instance, ‘Why didn’t John vote?’—‘He’s too
lazy’; ‘Why would you ignore somebody’s arguments?’—‘I’m stubborn’; ‘Why did
Anne greet her uncle politely?’—‘Because that’s how she was taught to’ are all exam-
ples of CHR explanations (Malle 1999, p. 31). Finally, enabling factor explanations
do “not clarify why the agent intended to act but rather how it was possible that the
intention turned into a successful action. Presupposing that the agent had reasons and
an intention to act, they cite factors that enabled the action to be performed as intended.
For example, ‘She worked through the night because she had a lot of coffee’” (Malle
2011b, p. 308).
The key point here is that in different studies, Malle and colleagues found that
“[r]eason explanations are the most frequently used mode [of explanation], comprising
about three-quarters of all action explanations” (2011a, p. 82). For instance, from over
700 participants and over 6000 explanations, on average, across five studies, people
offered 80% reason explanations of their own behavior, and 60% reason explanations
of other people’s behavior (Malle 2005, p. 165). While these studies involved ordinary
behaviors, in experiments involving puzzling behaviors, the same dominance of reason
explanations was discovered (Korman and Malle 2016).
These findings are relevant for assessing the teleological account, because, as noted,
reason explanations are in Malle et al.’s framework explanations in which people
appeal to an agent’s beliefs and/or desires, that is, to ‘unobservable’ mental states.
And advocates of the teleological account claim that in explaining actions, “[w]e
do not see ourselves as being made to act by unobservable internal states [but as]
acting for reasons, which are provided by publicly accessible circumstances in our
surroundings. And […] we consider others to be and act like us [emphasis added]”:
“Mentalizing only becomes relevant for covering unusual cases” of action explanation
(Perner and Esken 2015, p. 74, 76). The claim is that we are “concerned primarily
with worldly facts” rather than propositional attitudes when we are making sense of
people’s behavior (Perner et al. 2018, p. 102). Malle et al.’s data strongly suggest
otherwise, indicating that most action explanations in fact involve viewing the agent
as acting on the basis of propositional attitudes.
Notice, however, that Malle et al. distinguished between two different kinds of rea-
son explanations, between explanations involving marked reasons and explanations
involving unmarked reasons. To illustrate the distinction, in the studies mentioned,
the explanation ‘Jane called her husband because she thought she was late for dinner’
was categorized as a marked belief reason explanation, because it involves an explicit
reference to a mental state. In contrast, ‘Jane called her husband because she was late
for dinner’ was treated as an unmarked belief reason explanation, for it involves no
explicit reference to a belief but nonetheless captures a proposition that Jane believed
and that figured in her practical reasoning (Malle et al. 2007, p. 494, 509). Impor-
tantly, Malle and colleagues found that unmarked reason explanations were provided
more frequently than marked ones (Malle 2011b, p. 325). This is important because
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advocates of the teleological account might now hold that the data at issue in fact sup-
port their proposal. They might argue that unmarked reasons are effectively objective
reasons, non-mental facts that count in favor of acting (e.g., the fact that Jane was late
for dinner etc.).
However, now the intelligibility test introduced above becomes relevant again. For
consider the following example,
(I) Why did Jane call her husband?
(Ia) Because she was late for dinner.
(Ib) Because she was late for dinner, but she didn’t believe it.
(Ia) seems acceptable, but (Ib) is problematic. If Jane didn’t believe that she was late
for dinner, it becomes difficult to explain why she would still call her husband because
she was late for dinner. The point is the same as the one mentioned above inter alia
with respect to the example
(1) Why is S running toward the train?
(1a) Because that’s the way to catch the train.
(1b) Because that’s the way to catch the train, but she doesn’t believe it.
Since learning that S does not believe that running toward the train is the way to catch
the train creates doubts about why she is running toward the train, (1a) arguably rests
on an implicit assumption that S does believe that running toward the train is the way to
catch it. That is, the oddness of both (Ib) and (1b) suggests that underlying expressions
such as (Ia) and (1a) are ascriptions of beliefs, because it is the negation of the view
that S and Jane hold particular beliefs which gives rise to the puzzlement with (Ib) and
(1b). And indeed, similar9 considerations led Malle et al. (2007, p. 493) to categorize
expressions such as (Ia) and (1a) still as belief reason explanations (albeit unmarked
ones) in the first place.
Notice that it isn’t promising for advocates of the teleological account to now
respond that the puzzlement elicited by expressions such as (Ib) and (1b) can be
explained without postulating that the explainer ascribes full-fledged propositional
attitudes such as beliefs, rather than only subjective reasons (i.e., perspectival facts).
For it is specifically the use of the term ‘believe’ in (Ib) and (1b) that triggers the
intelligibility problem with these statements. If the explainer implicitly ascribed mental
states that aren’t yet conceptualized as beliefs then (Ib) and (1b) shouldn’t appear odd.
With these points in mind, since “reason explanations are the most frequently used
mode [of action explanation]” (Malle 2011a, p. 82), and since these explanations
explicitly or implicitly appeal to the agent’s propositional attitudes rather than objec-
tive or subjective reasons (i.e., non-mental or perspectival facts), the tenability of the
teleological account becomes questionable. If the account were correct, we would
9 Malle et al. (2007, p. 493) write that a “reason explanation becomes meaningless if the agent’s awareness
of the reason is denied, as in ‘Anne invited Ben for dinner because he had helped her paint her room
(even though she was not aware that he had helped her paint her room).’ Thus, when people offer reason
explanations, they make an assumption of subjectivity—they assume that the agent was aware of her reasons
and acted on those subjectively held reasons (whether or not they reflect objective facts).” Notice that Malle
et al.’s “subjectivity test” isn’t yet sufficient to show that implicit belief ascriptions are involved in unmarked
belief reason explanations, because it pertains only to an implicit ascription of awareness of reasons. The
intelligibility test that I introduced above, however, is.
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expect to find the opposite. Subjects should mostly invoke non-mental/perspectival
facts to make sense of people’s behavior and not (explicitly or implicitly) ascribe
propositional attitudes. But they don’t.
5.2 Actor–observer asymmetries and teleology
There is another way of assessing the tenability of the teleological account. It focuses
on a claim that advocates of the account make on the relationship between explanations
of one’s own action and explanations of other people’s actions. The claim is that the
basic strategy that we use to explain our own action is much the same as the one that
we employ to explain others’ behavior. Advocates of the teleological account maintain
that we assume that others act just like us for reasons that are provided by publically
accessible circumstances (Perner and Esken 2015, p. 74):
Teleology starts from the close resemblance between the reasoning involved
in understanding others’ actions and one’s own practical reasoning involved in
deciding what to do. […] The teleologist […] does not imagine being in the
other’s situation. However, she needs to engage in the same evaluation of this
situation and what needs doing to improve the situation as the other does, that
is, the practical reasoning has to be essentially shared. […] [Teleology] captures
that we consider other people to act in essential ways for the same reason as we
do […]. (Perner et al. 2018, p. 99, 103, 111)
If, as these passages suggest, we explain people’s action by reference to the same
kind of objective reasons (i.e., instrumental and evaluative facts) that figure in our
own practical reflection on what to do and in our explanations of our own acting, then
there shouldn’t be significant differences in the kind of explanations that we produce
for our own actions and those that we produce for other people’s action. Yet, data
from another set of studies conducted by Malle, Knobe, and colleagues challenges
this prediction too. Malle et al. (2007) conducted six experiments exploring whether
people explain their own action (henceforth actor perspective) in the same way as
they explain other people’s actions (henceforth observer perspective). Subjects were
presented with actions that either they themselves or someone else performed, and
then they were asked to explain why they, or the other person, acted the way they did.
Three strong and reliable actor–observer asymmetries emerged, what Malle et al. call,
a (1) reason asymmetry, a (2) belief asymmetry, and a (3) marker asymmetry:
Reason asymmetry Actors offered significantly more reason explanations than
observers did. Observers provided significantly more CHR explanations than actors
did.
Belief asymmetry Within participants’ reason explanations, actors used more belief
reasons and fewer desire reasons than observers did.
Marker asymmetry Actors left the mental states in their reason explanations more
often unmarked than observers did (Malle et al. 2007, p. 495f, 507).
Prima facie, these asymmetries are inconsistent with the teleological account. After
all, according to the account, agents’ reasons for acting are not only “publically acces-
sible”, but also “essentially” the same in the case of one’s own acting, and the case of
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other people’s acting (Perner et al. 2018, p. 103). So if the account were correct, one
would expect to find actor–observer symmetries rather than asymmetries. The point
is perhaps most evident when it comes to PT , in particular. For by assumption, PT
involves only a reference to objective facts and no perspective taking. If PT were pre-
dominantly involved in both actor and observer action explanations then there should
be no significant actor–observer asymmetry. Since there are three such asymmetries,
we have ground to reject the view that adults mainly use PT in their action explanations.
The point is less clear when it comes to TiP though because TiP does involve per-
spective taking (Roessler and Perner 2013, p. 40). With TiP in mind, the following
response on behalf of the advocate of the teleological account might be proposed.
When people use teleology to explain their own action, they don’t need to engage in
perspective taking but they still need to do so when they use TiP to explain another
agent’s actions. For they will then need to determine what the relevant (action deter-
mining) evaluative and instrumental facts are from within that agent’s perspective
(ibid). Using teleology in action explanation as an observer is thus likely to be more
difficult than using it in action explanation as an actor. The actor–observer asymme-
tries hence don’t pose a problem for the teleological account because TiP belongs to
teleology as well. Or so it might be argued.
However, if teleology in general were our main, routine, and preferred strategy to
explain agents’ action, one whose use is only reduced when insufficient background
knowledge for perspective taking is available then when observers gain more infor-
mation about agents (e.g., about their feelings, intentions, and personal history), this
should facilitate their perspective taking and TiP. And TiP, qua (by assumption) pre-
ferred, routine strategy, should become used more frequently, leading to a decrease in
actor–observer asymmetries.
Malle et al. (2007) conducted a follow-up study pertaining to the issue. In the study,
they compared two types of observer explanations of an agent’s behavior, one where
the agent was a stranger, and one where the observer knew the agent closely (e.g., a
friend). The prediction was that the actor–observer asymmetries would disappear when
observers explain close agents’ actions rather than that of strangers because they would
have more intimate knowledge in these cases that they could use to put themselves
into the position of the agents. Interestingly, the prediction was not confirmed. For
instance, intimate knowledge didn’t lead observers to offer more reason explanations
and it didn’t lead them to reduce their CHR explanations. This casts doubt on the view
that teleology is our routine and preferred method for explaining other people’s action.
Because if that view were right, providing observers with resources that facilitate TiP
should lead them to engage more often in perspective taking in their action explanation,
leading to an increase in reason explanations, which didn’t happen.
But if it isn’t a lack of intimate knowledge that causes the actor–observer asym-
metries, what else could be responsible? Based on previous studies in which subjects
increased their reason explanations when they were motivated to make the actor look
rational, Malle et al. (2000, 2007) thought that motivation might play a key role in
driving the asymmetries. They thus examined the role of “impression management”
in action explanations, that is, the role of observers’ “attempts to influence [their]
audience’s impression” of the agent by, for instance, making her look positive with
the action explanation (Malle et al. 2007, p. 495). Distant observers were told that
123
Synthese
when they were answering the Why-questions about an agent’s behavior, they should
try to create a good impression of the agent on the experimenter who was asking
the question. It turned out that in observers with the explicit motivation to create a
positive impression of the agent, the reason asymmetry, in particular, now began to
disappear. When observers “were motivated to portray the actor in a positive light[,
they produced] almost as many reason explanations as actors themselves did, but with-
out decreasing their causal history explanations” (ibid, p. 507). These findings suggest
that observers can explain agents’ actions in the same way as actors do and do so when
they are motivated in the right way, but frequently aren’t.
Having said that, these particular data don’t yet show that actors and observers use
different methods for explaining actions. Indeed, for all they suggest, teleology might
still be predominantly involved in both cases. For instance, overall, averaged across
five studies, Malle et al. found that observers offered 60% reason explanations, and
40% CHR explanations (Malle 2005, p. 165). So observers, just as actors, formed more
reason explanations than CHR explanations overall. Thus, while the actor–observer
asymmetries do contradict the view that PT is our main method for explaining actions,
it might seem that they don’t yet undermine the view that TiP fits that description. But
I argued in the preceding section that reason explanations are not teleological ones but
based on (implicit/explicit) mentalizing. If so, then the fact that reason explanations are
the most frequent ones among both actors and observers does speak strongly against
the view that TiP is our main strategy for explaining people’s actions; it adds further
detail to the initial argument.
5.3 CHR explanations and teleology
Since observers offer a significant number of CHR explanations (about 40%; Malle
2005, p. 165) alongside reasons explanations when making sense of intentional action,
advocates of the teleological account might explore the following response to the
discussion so far. They might hold that even if reason explanations aren’t teleological
ones, CHR explanations still are. And since these explanations play a significant role
particularly in observers, teleology remains an important, frequently used method for
explaining what people do.
But are CHR explanations teleological explanations of the kind advocates of the
teleological account are focusing on? For that to be the case, CHR factors would need
to be objective reasons (i.e., instrumental or evaluative facts) or subjective reasons
(i.e., perspectival facts). There is ground to believe that they are neither.10
Consider two examples of CHR explanations. ‘Why didn’t John vote?’—‘He’s too
lazy’; ‘Why would you ignore somebody’s arguments?’—‘I’m stubborn’. It seems
clear that the CH factors involved (i.e., laziness, stubbornness) aren’t subjective rea-
sons. For advocates of the teleological account maintain that to “say that you have a
subjective reason to [ϕ] is to say that, from your perspective it looks as if you have
an (objective) reason to do so” (Perner and Roessler 2010, p. 204). And in the cases
10 Notice that there might be notions of objective reasons and subjective reasons according to which CH
factors are objective and/or subjective reasons. I here want to focus only on the notions introduced above
and proposed by advocates of the teleological account.
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at issue, laziness and stubbornness don’t enter the agent’s own perspective but are
“external” to it (Malle et al. 2007, p. 494).
Might they be objective reasons, that is, instrumental or evaluative facts? In the
examples, laziness and stubbornness evidently aren’t instrumental facts. They aren’t a
means to an end. Turning to evaluative facts, these facts pertain to what is important,
desirable, necessary, or good for the agent (Perner and Roessler 2010, p. 204; Roessler
and Perner 2013, p. 37), and determine the agent’s goal, attracting the agent towards
a particular end state. Now, propositions such as S is lazy and S is stubborn refer to
negative values (laziness, stubbornness). Since laziness or stubbornness are not ‘good
for’ S (neither per se, nor from her perspective), they aren’t evaluative facts of the
kind that figure in teleological explanations as objective reasons. For according to the
teleological account, teleological explanations assume that agents act on the basis of
goals which are thought to be “good for” them: the agent’s “goal is something ‘good’
in some minimal sense of being attractive, desirable, needed, worthwhile having, etc.”
(Roessler and Perner 2013; Perner and Esken 2015, p. 71). Hence, when observers
mention an agent’s laziness or stubbornness as the facts that account for why the agent
is acting, it is unlikely that they are using teleology rather than, for instance, principles
such as ‘lazy people don’t like to vote’, ‘stubborn people don’t like to grant others’
arguments’ etc.
Of course, the category of CHR factors includes not only laziness or stubbornness. It
covers all sorts of dispositions, personality, upbringing, culture, and context. Since that
is so, there might also be positive evaluative facts that fit the bill of objective reasons.
But since CHR factors don’t provide a basis for holding that teleology is involved
in action explanations appealing to negative features, and we have no independent
ground to suspect that things are different in the positive case, it seems explanatorily
more parsimonious to hold that teleology is also not involved when CH factors are
positive evaluative facts. In any case, since at best only a restricted subset of CHR
explanations qualifies as explanations referring to evaluative facts that might count
as objective reasons, it is fair to say that in most cases, these explanations won’t be
teleological ones. Thus, even if we only focus on the frequency of observers’ CHR
explanations, it is unlikely that teleology is our main and routine method for making
sense of other people’s intentional behavior.
6 Conclusion
Philosophers and psychologists have recently proposed a teleological account of action
explanation according to which we explain people’s actions predominantly by invoking
only publically accessible, non-mental facts. The tenability of the account is philo-
sophically interesting, because the account challenges the received view of action
explanation in philosophy of action, which holds that intentional actions are explained
by mentalizing. Focusing on action explanation in adults, I argued in support of the
received view. I did so by using social psychological data combined with theoretical
considerations related to the intelligibility test. They suggest that most often when we
explain intentional behavior, we don’t do so in terms of non-mental or perspectival
facts alone but by (implicitly or explicitly) ascribing propositional attitudes to agents.
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Social psychological research also suggests that there are actor–observer asymmetries
that contradict the view that PT , in particular, is our main method for explaining other
people’s actions. None of this is to deny that teleological thinking plays a role in action
explanation in children (especially in those younger than 4) and adults. Perhaps, in
our action explanations, as children and adults, we often draw on considerations per-
taining to evaluative and instrumental facts that count in favor of acting and assume
that agents act in ways they should, given their goals. This might be an important part
of the mentalizing involved in making behavior intelligible. While that isn’t the view
advocates of the teleological account currently propose, it is plausible and remains
tenable in the light of the arguments introduced here.
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